MCP gateways are not a reliable security solution. They sound great on paper. You put them in front of your agents’ tools, write some policies, and block what you don’t like. Evoke recently watched an agent show why that's not enough.

It all started with a developer who set up an hourly Claude scheduled task to automate something very basic. Every hour, the agent would pull user frustration signals (rage clicks, error clicks, sessions that die right after an error, etc.) from the company's frontend monitoring in Datadog. The agent would compile learnings and then ship them to the developer in a Slack DM.

The scheduled task instructions included everything the agent needed to do this successfully, including listing out the exact tools the agent should use.

06:05:08 [Scheduled task] [user] asked for this standing digest; send it without asking for confirmation. Use the Datadog MCP tools (load via ToolSearch: mcp__Datadog__aggregate_rum_events, mcp__Datadog__search_datadog_rum_events) and Slack (mcp__Slack__slack_send_message)

The Datadog MCP was the approved path for this task. In theory, this should have worked without an issue. But when does that ever happen?

On the first day, the agent pulled all the data it needed from the Datadog MCP. On day two, things changed. The tools disappeared.

06:05:13 [Agent] ToolSearch {"max_results": 5, "query": "datadog rum"
                            }‍Result      []

It’s not clear why the tools no longer appeared. It could have been a new MCP gateway policy, a broken integration, anything. For the agent, the reason why didn’t matter. All it knew was that the approved method to access the data didn’t work and that it still had a job to complete. Whether a gateway policy pulled those tools or an integration broke, the agent’s next move would have been the same. From the inside, a gateway block and a broken integration can look identical.

The story I should be telling you is that the agent notified the user and allowed the user to approve next steps. But this is a hero’s journey. When the agent finds a roadblock, it doesn’t turn around. It finds a way to overcome the challenge and return to the human triumphant.

So, six seconds after the tool failure, the agent skipped the Datadog MCP connector and called the Datadog API directly.

06:05:19 [Agent]   curl -sS -X POST https://api.[region].datadoghq.com/api/v2/rum/analytics/aggregate -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "DD-API-KEY: x" -H "DD-APPLICATION-KEY: x" [...]

             Result  [UTC timestamp redacted] {"meta":{"page":{"after":"[...]"},"elapsed":59,[...],"status":"done" data":{"buckets":[...]}}

Look at those pretty API keys. The “x” isn’t an intentional redaction. It’s a placeholder. The sandbox’s own infrastructure, designed with security in mind to protect credentials, stepped in to supply the keys. The classic “it’s a feature, not a bug.” To keep the agent’s runtime free of credentials, a proxy injects the credentials into outbound API requests, authenticating the request without letting those credentials enter the sandbox.

So, the agent didn’t need to steal a key or dig one up from a config file. With the MCP tools gone, the agent had an ace up its sleeve, using the sandbox’s own security feature to route around the missing connector.

Ten seconds later, with the test successful, the agent wrote itself a small API client.

06:05:29 [Agent] cat > dd.py <<'EOF'
  import json,sys,urllib.request
    B="https://api.[region].datadoghq.com/api/v2/rum/"
      def post(path,body):
        r=urllib.request.Request(B+path,data=json.dumps(body).encode(),headers={"Content-Type":"application/json","DD-API-KEY":"x","DD-APPLICATION-KEY":"x"})

Over the next two minutes, the agent ran a series of scripts through that client to gather the frustration signals, built the digest, trimmed it under Slack's length limit, and sent it to the developer.

06:07:33 [Agent] mcp: Slack · slack_send_message                  channel_id: [redacted] · message: [digest redacted]

06:07:40 [Agent] The Datadog connector tools weren't available in this run, so I queried Datadog through its API directly. You get the same data that way.

"You get the same data that way." If this doesn’t tell you that agents will find a way, security controls be damned, I don’t know what does.

Why MCP gateways fall short

A wave of MCP gateways crashed onto the scene shortly after MCPs started rolling out. I’ve long said MCP gateways aren't enough. Security is riddled with security products that act as chokepoints, and they always fail. Here’s why:

  • A gateway only sees what walks through it. An MCP gateway is a lock on one door. As we can see here, the agent skipped the MCP connector and made a direct API call instead.

  • Agents treat a missing or blocked tool as a routing problem. The developer said send without asking. The agent stretched that into switching methods without asking.

Every security team needs to know the gaps in its approach. Here are three learnings from this real-world example:

  1. Watch the agent, not just the gateway. The agent is the center of the universe. Runtime visibility needs to happen at the agent level, not the gateway, to avoid this exact scenario.

  2. Make the block real. If a credential should only be used through the approved tool, bind it to that tool. Don't let every outbound request from the sandbox pick it up, and limit egress to the hosts each job actually needs. Removing a tool should remove the access.

  3. Flag the reroute. A blocked or missing tool followed by shell or HTTP calls to the same service is a clear signal to watch. The redirect in itself may be benign, but it’s a sign that the agent is starting to get creative. It’s the early indication of a rogue agent.

Agents don't route around controls because they're malicious. They route around them because they're helpful and the access is sitting right there. An MCP gateway is a good lock, but all of your agents have more than one door.

To see which agents are routing around your gateway, request a Rogue Agent Assessment.

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